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Abstract
On 25 October 2019, the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies hosted the fourth Annual Conference of the Florence Com-
petition Programme (FCP) at the European University Institute (EUI) 
campus in Florence. The conference discussed the main ideas behind 
the new 'hipster antitrust' movement in USA and its influence on EU 
competition policy. The event was opened with a keynote speech 
delivered by Prof. Marina Lao, Seton Hall University. The confer-
ence was divided into three panels, which dealt respectively with i) 
'The goals of EU competition policy: shall we go beyond consumers’ 
welfare?'; ii) 'Exploitative abuses in the pharma and digital markets' 
and iii) 'How to tackle concentration in digital markets'. The event 
gathered different stakeholders, including competition enforcers, as 
well as representatives from academia, industry, law and economic 
consulting firms. The diversity of views ensured a lively debate. This 
Policy Brief summarises the main points raised during the discussion 
and seeks to stimulate further debate.
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The Goals of EU Competition Policy: 
Should We Go Beyond Consumers’ 
Welfare?
In the view of many observers, USA antitrust enforcers’ 
attitudes have been surprisingly lax in response to the 
recent and unparalleled growth of the technology sec-
tor,1 thus allowing platforms which were already domi-
nant to consolidate their power in digital markets. This 
trend has led, in recent years, to a heated debate which 
revolved around the idea of reinvigorating antitrust law 
by challenging the consumer welfare paradigm, claiming 
that a narrow focus on short-term price and output effects 
would overlook important considerations that are related 
to quality, choice and innovation. In this respect, the 
'New Brandeis' / 'Hipster' antitrust scholars have gone 
even further by holding that the main constraint associ-
ated with such paradigm is that it does not address the 
social consequences of concentration, including wealth 
and income inequality, privacy intrusions, data security 
breaches as well as political corruption. 2
At the conference, a number of speakers argued that 
while it is true that the US antitrust enforcement has 
fallen short in dealing with the new challenges that are 
generated by the digital economy, this may be due to fac-
tors apart from any legal deficiencies relating to the con-
sumer welfare paradigm. The difficulty of applying non-
1. Google, Facebook, Apple, Amazon, and Microsoft, in the ag-
gregate, have managed to make over 500 acquisitions in the past 
ten to fifteen years, in several cases without any challenge from 
either the American or European antitrust enforcers. See M. Lao, 
Strengthening Antitrust Enforcement within the Consumer Wel-
fare Rubric, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, November 2019.
2. Considering alternatives to economic efficiency as objectives for 
antitrust enforcement can raise major concerns. In particular, 
there is a wide consensus that antitrust should not be distracted 
from its economic efficiency mission, since no other economy 
wide tool would be capable of doing it. See T. Brennan, Should 
Antitrust Go Beyond ‘Antitrust’?, 63 Antitrust Bulletin 49, 2018. 
In the vast array of existing literature o the topic, see also Lina 
M. Khan, The New Brandeis Movement: America’s Monopoly 
Debate, 9, Journal of European Competition Law and Practice 
131, 2018. The term was originally coined by Kostia Medve-
dovsky; the name was taken from Louis Brandeis, who served 
on the US Supreme Court between 1916 and 1939. For criticisms 
of the movement, see, inter alia, E. Dorsey, J. Rybnicek and J. D. 
Wright, Hipster Antitrust Meets Public Choice Economics: The 
Consumer Welfare Standard, Rule of Law, and Rent-Seeking, 
Competition Policy International Antitrust Chronicle, 2018.
price metrics and burdensome evidentiary standards may 
have played an important role in impeding the ability of 
antitrust agencies to keep up with the new digital mar-
kets. A number of speakers at the conference therefore 
argued in favor of introducing 'smart changes', in order 
to streamline US antitrust enforcement in the digital 
markets, while retaining the consumer welfare standard. 
Such an adjustment would strengthen antitrust enforce-
ment without producing the disruptive result abandoning 
a paradigm that is conceptually sound and that is capable 
of a broader reach than is typically assumed, if it is inter-
preted beyond its literal meaning.
During the first panel of the conference, the discussion 
focused on the inclusion of considerations that are related 
to 'fairness' in the application of antitrust law. First, some 
of the panelists noted that, from a procedural perspec-
tive, there exists a widespread agreement that ensuring 
'fair' treatment during the course of antitrust investiga-
tions is indispensable. However, when it comes to the 
substantive assessment of anti-competitive practices, one 
must admit that there is a risk of unpredictability that has 
to be addressed in order to avoid the misuse of antitrust 
enforcement. Therefore, panelists noted that the very-
well known battle for the 'soul' of antitrust can be traced 
back to the dispute between those who claim that markets 
would work more efficiently when unconstrained by reg-
ulation against those for whom economics represents just 
one of the tools that can be used to fulfil the objectives of 
antitrust law. 3 
The new Brandeis School, the most recent movement to 
advocate in favor of fairness considerations in the US, 
has put special emphasis on the link between, on the 
one hand, permissive antitrust enforcement, and, on the 
other hand, market power and inequality risks. In the EU, 
antitrust enforcers’ line of action has shown that there is 
a certain will to look beyond consumers’ effects when 
assessing the anti-competitive effects of certain busi-
ness practices; a trend that cannot be observed equally 
on the other side of the Atlantic. The record €4.34 bil-
lion fine imposed by the European Commission in July 
2018, in the Google Android case4, represents a promi-
3. E. M. Fox, The Battle for the Soul of Antitrust, 75 California Law 
Review 917, 1987.
4. European Commission, Case AT.40099 Google Android, 18 
July, 2018.
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nent example in this respect. Significantly, whereas the 
European Commission considered Google’s conduct to 
be in breach of Art. 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU), in the US, the case was 
unanimously dropped by the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), in 2013.5
Interestingly, some of the youngest antitrust jurisdictions 
have taken into consideration goals that are different 
from consumer welfare and efficiency. China’s Anti-Mo-
nopoly Law lists the “protection of fair competition in 
the market” among the objectives of its legislation, while 
contemplating the realisation of the 'healthy develop-
ment of the socialist market economy' at the same time6. 
This type of approach is openly rejected by those who 
are unwilling to accept the influence of industrial policy 
on antitrust. However, it is useful to demonstrate the 
existence of a certain parallelism of China with the EU 
with regard to consumer harm and foreclosure effects 
when assessing anti-competitive practices on the basis of 
sound economic analysis. In this respect, the main con-
clusion reached at the conference was that a cross-border 
dialogue seems to be the way forward for launching a 
new, fairness-based, era of antitrust.
Finally, other panelists suggested that discussions 
relating to the aims of EU competition law are as con-
troversial as in other jurisdictions, due to the existence 
of some confusion over what the 'aims' are. In their view, 
the enlargement of the scope of EU competition law does 
not have much to do with its aims, rather, it deals with 
the development of techniques that aim to ensure that 
consumer welfare or economic freedom are safeguarded. 
They concluded that the most compelling concern is that 
the burden of proof placed on the Commission is often 
excessively high, as shown in Cartes Bancaires.7 Advo-
cating changes is therefore worthy of attention, as long as 
such changes are directed towards the current evidentiary 
burdens rather than to the enlargement of the “aims” of 
EU competition law. 
5. See S. Marco Colino, The Antitrust F Word, Fairness Consider-
ations in Competition Law, Journal of Business Law, 2018.
6. Anti-monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted 
at the 29th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 10th Nation-
al People’s Congress on 30 August ,2007.
7. Case C-67/13, Groupement des Cartes Bancaires v. European 
Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2204, 2014.
Exploitative Abuses in the Pharma and 
Digital Markets
Since the Treaty of Rome, Article 102 TFEU has listed 
several forms of exploitative conduct as examples of 
the abuse of a dominant position. In particular, a dom-
inant firm can neither impose 'unfair purchase or selling 
prices' (i.e., excessive pricing) and 'other unfair trading 
conditions',8 nor “discriminate” between its custom-
ers.9 Due to the inability to set clear guidelines on what 
constitutes exploitative abuses and a possible overlap 
with sector-regulation, in the past sixty years the Euro-
pean Commission has seldom investigated exploitative 
abuses. In recent years, however, the Commission and 
a number of National Competition Authorities (NCAs) 
have investigated a number of cases concerning exploit-
ative abuses in a number of industries, such as energy, 
and the pharmaceutical and digital markets. During the 
conference, panelists debated the reasons for the current 
'revival' of exploitative abuses in Europe. Some speakers 
noticed that, by sanctioning excessive prices, a compe-
tition agency often tries to achieve a number of addi-
tional objectives beyond the consumers’ welfare. In this 
regard, some panelists referred to the European Commis-
sion’s 1973 decision in United Brands. By finding that 
the prices for bananas in Ireland were illegally exces-
sive, the Commission aimed to achieve anti-inflationary 
objectives, thus going beyond the traditional goals of EU 
competition policy. On appeal, the EU Court of Justice 
quashed the decision, finding that the European Commis-
sion had failed to consider additional factors that might 
explain the 'excessive' price of bananas in Ireland com-
pared to other EU Member States (i.e., higher transport 
costs and fluctuations in the wholesale prices of bananas). 
The United Brands ruling thus introduced a high burden 
of proof that was needed for the competition agency to 
sanction cases relating to excessive prices under Art. 102 
TFEU; a high threshold that still exists today.10
8. Art. 102(a) TFEU
9. Art. 102 (c) TFEU.
10. It is worth mentioning that in the US antitrust law does not pre-
vent firms with legally acquired market power from charging 
profit maximizing prices.
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During the conference, panelists discussed recent cases 
of excessive prices that involved the manufacturers of 
generic drugs, such as the Aspen11 case in Italy, and the 
Pfizer-Flynn12 case in the UK. Some speakers noticed that 
the entry of generic manufacturers into the market usu-
ally lead to a price drop for off-patent drugs. Secondly, 
price variations may be due to the temporary fluctuations 
in supply and demand in the market. Thirdly, in regu-
lating the retail price of drugs, the health care authority 
looks at the portfolio of generic drugs as a whole, rather 
than to the price of individual drugs. Consequently, the 
'excessive' price of some generic drugs may be explained 
by different factors. From this perspective, anti-trust 
intervention would be justified only in cases in which 
the generic manufacturer engages in an aggressive nego-
tiation strategy with the health care authority, threat-
ening the authority by threatening to withhold the drug 
from the national market, if the authority did not agree 
with the proposed price increase (i.e., the Aspen case in 
Italy). Other panelists, however, contended that such an 
approach, noting that, under some specific cases, generic 
drugs’ prices may fulfil the conditions that are usually 
identified by economists as justifying an anti-trust inter-
vention: manufacturers may have significant market 
power, since some medicines are not substitutable for 
patients; anti-trust intervention does not negatively affect 
the incentives of the manufacturers to innovate, since the 
drug is off-patent; finally, the health care authorities seem 
unable to solve the issue of excessive prices for generic 
drugs. In view of these considerations, some speakers 
argued that competition policy intervention seems justi-
fied in the case of certain instances of excessive prices for 
generic drugs. However, alternative anti-trust tools (e.g., 
market studies and merger control) may be more suitable 
than sanctioning excessive prices under Art. 102 TFEU.
Other panelists, however, objected to this restrictive 
approach, noting that the prices of generic drugs fulfil 
the conditions that are usually identified by economists 
as justifying an antitrust intervention: manufacturers 
usually have significant market power, since the medi-
cines are not substitutable for patients, and the market 
11.  Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Decision No. 
26185, 29 September 2016.
12.  UK Competition Appeal Tribunal, Flynn Pharma Ltd and Flynn 
Pharma (Holdings) Ltd v Competition and Markets Authority. 
Ruled on 7 June 2018, 1275/1/12/17.
is characterised by high entry barriers; antitrust inter-
vention does not negatively affect the incentives of the 
manufacturers to innovate, since the drug is off-patent; 
finally, the health care authorities seem unable to solve 
the issue of excessive prices for generic drugs. In view 
of these considerations, some speakers argued that com-
petition policy intervention seems justified in the case of 
excessive prices for generic drugs. However, alternative 
antitrust tools (e.g., market studies and merger control) 
may be more suitable than sanctioning excessive prices 
under Art. 102 TFEU.
In discussing the 'revival' of exploitative abuses in 
Europe, panelists also debated the decision by the German 
Bundeskartellamt concerning Facebook13 and the pre-
liminary injunction adopted by the Higher Regional 
Court of Düsseldorf in August 2019. Although the case 
is still pending at the moment of writing, in its prelimi-
nary injunction, the Düsseldorf Court showed “serious 
doubts“ about the legality of the Bundeskartellamt deci-
sion. During the debate, some panelists criticized the 
Bundeskartellamt decision, since the authority analysed 
Facebook's conduct under data protection, rather than 
competition, rules, thus going beyond its institutional 
mandate. In addition, the authority based its decision 
under Art. 19 of the German Act against Restraints on 
Competition (GWB), rather than on Art. 102 TFEU, in 
spite of the clear cross-border dimension of Facebook’s 
conduct.
How to Tackle Concentration in Digital 
Markets
Digital markets are characterised by a few large players, 
the so-called GAFA (i.e., Google, Amazon, Facebook and 
Apple). Statistics show that the market share of GAFA 
has substantially increased in every market in which they 
operate during the past decade.  Although GAFA started as 
small start-ups some decades ago, and they operate in mar-
kets characterised by a high degree of innovation, it seems 
unlikely that new start-ups may be able to overtake GAFA’s 
dominant role in the digital markets in future years.
13.  The German text of the decision is available at: 
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/DE/
AktuelleMeldungen/2019/29_03_2019_Ver%C3%B6ffentlichung_
Entscheidungen_Facebook.html  (15.1.2020).
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A number of solutions have been put forward to attempt 
to solve the issue of the increasing degree of concentration 
in digital markets. According to the new Brandeis antitrust 
movement, the high degree of market concentration justifies 
an ex-ante 'structural approach' by competition enforcers. 
From this point of view, some speakers have noticed that 
the multiple multi-billion fines that were imposed in the 
past few years by the European Commission on Google 
have proved ineffective in correcting the firm’s market 
behaviour. In this regard, it is worth noticing that the US 
Senator Elizabeth Warren, has suggested 'breaking-up' 
GAFA, although it is unclear how this approach would 
affect the business models of these firms and, consequently, 
the network benefits they create for consumers. Alterna-
tively, behavioural remedies, such as mandated access to 
data, have also been proposed as being a suitable solution 
through which to mitigate GAFA’s market power, although 
it remains unclear how such solutions might be enforced 
in practice by a competition agency. Thirdly, a number 
of authors have suggested that the increased market con-
centration could be tackled via a change in the procedural 
aspects of competition policy enforcement, for instance, by 
reversing the burdens of proof and lowering the standards 
for judicial review. 
During the conference, panelists discussed the case of 
increased market concentration in the media industry. 
While traditional media are financed both by advertise-
ments and subscription revenues, the new digital media 
are financed exclusively via targeted advertising, which is 
more effective for advertisers. During the last 8 years, for 
example, the New York Times has lost 74% of its revenues 
from advertising, while Google advertising gains have 
jumped. The decline of the traditional media has had a neg-
ative impact on the plurality of information and decreases 
the quality of that information.  Unlike traditional media, 
social platforms do not control the accuracy of the informa-
tion that is posted by their users and thus do less than they 
potentially could to halt the spread of 'fake news'. During 
the conference, speakers debated the effectiveness of pos-
sible solutions that aimed to safeguard media plurality, for 
instance, the ex-ante prohibition of new acquisitions by 
digital media companies. 
Another aspect debated during the conference was the role 
of merger control in digital markets. A number of speakers 
agreed that merger control should be adapted to the reality 
of the digital markets. Firstly, a number of countries (i.e., 
Germany and Austria) have recently introduced a new 
transaction value threshold for merger notification in order 
to catch acquisitions that would otherwise fall outside their 
jurisdiction. Secondly, the traditional approach to market 
definition seems to be outdated, due to the prevalence of 
multi-sided markets in the digital world. In addition, the 
recent EU Commission report on competition policy in the 
digital economy has suggested that conglomerate mergers 
should be assessed with closer scrutiny,14 when the acquired 
and acquiring firms operate in the same 'technological and 
users’ space' (i.e.,  a broader concept than the traditional 
definition of a relevant market), and the transaction should 
be considered to be de facto horizontal, rather than as a 
conglomerate merger. Finally, in terms of theories of harm, 
nowadays, merger control pays greater attention to the 
impact of the transaction on the incentives of the merging 
parties to innovate. 
Finally, panelists discussed the proliferation of reports 
recently published by different competition authorities in 
Europe on the challenges faced by competition policy in 
the digital economy.15 Although the focus of such reports 
is slightly different, they all call for a strengthened degree 
of antitrust enforcement in the digital economy. However, 
some panelists also noticed that the current attention being 
given to the digital economy in Europe seems to be guided 
by a rather 'emotional' reaction, due to an awareness that 
Europe is lagging behind in the 4th industrial revolution. 
However, it is currently unclear what the outcome of the 
recent wave of policy reports will be, as amendments to 
the Treaty and to EU Merger Control Regulation are very 
unlikely at the moment. A strengthened antitrust enforce-
ment vis-à-vis big tech firms may be undertaken only by 
broadening the existing theories of harm that are mentioned 
in the enforcement guidelines of the competition agencies. 
14. J. Crémer, Y.A. De Montjoye, H. Schweitzer, Competition Policy 
for the Digital Era, report carried out on behalf of DG Competi-
tion of the European Commission, 2019. 
15. Among the reports published in the course of 2019, see: J. Crémer, 
Y.A. De Montjoye, H. Schweitzer, ibid.; M., Schallbruch, H. Sch-
weitzer, A. Wambach, Competition Law 4.0, report carried out 
on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economy Affairs 
and Industry; J. Furman and others, Unlocking Digital Competi-
tion, report carried out on behalf of the UK Government.
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expanding membership of the European Union, developments in Europe’s neighbourhood and the wider world. 
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